

Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island(2010): An Analysis based on Protracted Conflict Theory*

연평도 포격(2010): 장기갈등이론에 의한 분석

Chang, Keung-Ryong**

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Abstract(요약): This study examines the utility of protracted conflict theory. North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong island of South Korea in 2010 is studied as a case. This study argues that both national interest and national identity are sources of protracted conflict, and that three variables are important in sustaining protracted conflicts, namely: decision-makers' perceptions of their enemies, institutionalized commitments of each state involving a protracted conflict, and biased coping strategies. The study concludes not only that the protracted conflict theory provides us a theoretical explanatory power of inter-Korea conflict, but also that the North's bombardment of Yeonpyeong island is a sub-conflict behavior of the inter-Korea protracted conflict which has lingered over the past 67 years and will contribute to be a major concern for the two Koreas.

Key Words(핵심어): Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island(연평도 포격), Inter-Korea

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** Department of Childhood English Education, Kwangju Women's University
(Email: krchang@kwu.ac.kr)

Conflict(남북한 갈등), NLL(북방한계선), North Korea(북한),
Protracted Conflict(장기갈등), South Korea(남한)

I. Introduction

Despite perceived common goals(e.g., unification), what would provoke North Korea to bomb Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea on November 23rd, 2010? How did South Korea counter-measure against this North Korean attack? In broader terms, why have the two Koreas, once people of the same nation, continued their conflict for almost 70 years? What generates the inter-Korea conflict into a protracted conflict? This is the core question for this study. To answer this question, I have decided to take an in-depth look at the sequence events leading up to, during, and following the event now commonly coined “The bombardment of Yeonpyeong island.” This study will primarily focus and hopefully shine light on the cause/effect theories of how the North Korean bombardment event of 2010 on Yeonpyeong island along with the South Korean counter-fires that followed were sub-conflict behaviors within the process of the Inter-Korea protracted conflict.

This study begins with the examination of theoretical aspects of protracted conflict. In this section, I analyze the following three major previous studies of long-term conflict: protracted conflict theory, enduring rivalry theory, and the strategic rivalry theory. Following this initial examination portion, I will then begin my introduction of conceptual framework for a protracted conflict, which will conclude with a detailed case study on the possible rationalizations on why the North Korea’s bombardment of Yeonpyeong island was implemented. Also included In this final section, I will begin with a brief description of what was reported to have happened during this crisis, touch on its political significance, as well as the background of events that led up to this crisis happening.

To properly contextualize the November 23rd bombing event, I decided to briefly examine the following previous inter-Korea conflicts of the 1990s: the first naval

battle of Yeonpyeong island(1999), the second naval battle of Yeonpyeong island (2002), the naval battle of Daechong island(2009), and the sinking of ROK warship Cheonan(2010). I then followed this up with a more detailed analysis of the bombardment incident in a successive manner: pre-crisis phase, international crisis phase, and end-crisis phase. A final look on the impact of the bombardment will then be discussed. In explaining the inter-Korea Yeonpyeong crisis which was originally caused by North Korea's choice to aggressively fire sea-to-land missiles at the island I will also attempt to gesture with the explanations of the North Korean's choice to bombard and the issue of the Northern Limit Line(NLL).

II. Previous Studies on Protracted Conflict

Major previous studies that deal with extended duration of hostility can be categorized as 'protracted conflict' theory, 'enduring rivalry' theory, and 'strategic rivalry' theory. The term 'protracted conflict'¹⁾ was introduced by Edward Azar and his colleagues in 1978. Azar and his colleagues(Azar et al., 1978: 50) defined a protracted conflict as "hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare.... [t]hey linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination.... Protracted conflicts, that is to say, are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point in time; they are processes." however, we should be careful not to include 'sporadic outbreaks of open warfare' into a definition of protracted conflict. This is because the US and the USSR, which did not have open warfare though they had protracted conflict. Thus the characteristics of a protracted conflict is confined to extended hostile interaction, high stakes, spill over to many domains, and conflict process over time(Brecher, 2008: 7).

Concerning the concept of 'enduring rivalry', Diehl and Goertz(2000: 19) argued

1) For the literature on 'protracted conflict', see Azar, 1986; Azar and Farah, 1981; Brecher, 1984, 2008; Rasler, 2001; Rothman, 1992; Strausz-Hupe, 1959.

that enduring rivalry is defined by spatial consistency, time or duration, and militarized competitiveness or conflict. They added to say that “‘rivalry’ broadly refers to repeated, militarized conflict between states: rivalry is a relationship in which both sides deal with issues using the military tools of foreign policy. If such militarized relationships last long enough, the rivalry becomes ‘enduring’”(Goertz and Diehl, 2000: 222-23). Maoz and Mor(2002: 4-5) argued that an enduring rivalry must have four characteristics: “an outstanding set of unresolved issues, strategic interdependence, psychological manifestation of enmity, and repeated militarized conflict.”²⁾

Colaresi et al. defined a ‘strategic rivalry’ as “...relationships in which decision-makers have singled out other states as distinctive competitors and enemies posing some actual or potential military threat... Rivalry requires the combination of competition and the perception of threat from an enemy...”(Colaresi et al., 2008: 3-4). In addition, Colaresi et al. emphasized that rivals “are part of a historical process in which a pair of states create and sustain a relationship of atypical hostility for some period of time... What they do in the present is also conditioned by evaluations about future ramifications of current choices... thus... rivals deal with each other in a psychologically charged context of path dependent hostility...”(Colaresi et al., 2008: 21). To qualify as a strategic rivalry,³⁾ a conflict must have four characteristics: competition over distinctive goal incompatibilities, being unable to resolve completely the source of conflict, alteration of the way objective events are perceived, and considerable variation in the intensity of competition over time each case(Colaresi et al., 2008: 4, 10, 12, 14).

The above mentioned three major theories on long-term conflicts points out four common phenomena in each long-term conflict. First, all the states involving a long-term conflict has incompatible goals which do not allow an easy conflict resolution. Second, because of the unresolved issues, states involving long-term

2) For the literature on ‘enduring rivalry’, see Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Goertz and Diehl, 2005; Hensel, 1999; Hensel et al, 2000; Huth, 1996; Leng, 2000.

3) Other contributors to the literature on ‘strategic rivalry’, see Colaresi(2001, 2004, 2005); Colaresi and Thompson(2002); Colarsei et al.(2008); Dreyer(2010); Rasler(2005); Rasler and Thompson(2001); Thompson(2001); Valrerino(2013).

conflict experience numerous militarized conflicts through long periods of time. Third, due to its successive conflicts, the conflict becomes a historical process to the states involving long-term conflict. Lastly, all the states involving protracted conflicts have psychological dimension in their foreign policy decision-making. Examination of the previous studies on long-term conflict convinces us that a more careful delineation of the key variables that stimulates long-term conflicts is essential. The following is a brief conceptual framework for the study of protracted conflicts.

III. Conceptual Framework and Research Questions

Although scholars have dealt with long-term conflict -protracted conflict, enduring rivalry, and strategic rivalry- most do not provide a clear conceptual framework for their study. I define a protracted conflict as “a cumulative conflict between the same adversaries who endeavor to protect and preserve their national interest and/or national identity, actual or perceived. The conflict is characterized by a series of sub-conflicts such as international crises, war, and consistent accommodation failures”(Chang, 1996: 26). In my study, the dependent variable is protracted conflict. The two independent variables that lead to protracted conflict are related to the process of protracted conflict: national interest and national identity. I specify national interest into national security, economic prosperity, and politico-diplomatic capability. If there are significant discrepancies between two or more states in protecting and/or enlarging one or more of these interests, a protracted conflict may arise. By national identity I refer to this as a people’s sense of themselves as a nation. This self-perception may be based on ethnicity, ideology, and religion. If both parties perceive incompatibility of identity, serious and intractable conflict may result(Bloom, 1990: 23; Northrup, 1989: 67-70). Interest and/or identity are basic factors that lead to conflict. The onset of crisis or war, however, may not be fully understood without knowledge of the situation in which decisions related to these

conflicts were made. When decision-makers perceive a stimulus as a potential factor in enhancing or threatening their national interest and/or national identity, the stimulus creates a situation in which foreign policy may change. The intervening variable in my study thus is primarily focused on the decision-making process.

First, the decision-makers' perception, in the decision-making process, is extremely important. The stimulus from environmental change is subjectively perceived and interpreted by decision-makers. Brecher and his colleagues(1969) believe that environmental stimuli, external or internal, are filtered through the image of decision-makers and thus influence their decisions. Decision-makers' perceptions thus are one of the crucial elements in comprehending a state's foreign policy. Holsti and his colleagues(1968: 128-129) view perception as the process by which decision-makers become aware of stimuli from their environment, and interpret or assign meaning to them. In particular, a distorted perception of an adversary may lead to the misinterpretation of signals from the adversary. A false image or misperception on the part of decision-makers thus can be a factor in precipitating war(Stoessinger, 1985). Accordingly, perception of bilateral relations affects the attitudes and posture of states involved in conflict. Misperception, miscalculation, or misunderstanding between states involved in a protracted conflict thus further stimulates the possibility of drastic escalation of conflict.

Second, institutionalized commitments may constrain the decision-making process in protracted conflict. Institutionalized commitments(e.g., governmental policy or organizations implementing decision-makers' commitment) are formed through previous conflicts. The greater the threat to national interest and/or identity, the stronger is the decision-makers' commitment to preserve them. In other words, in protracted conflict, decision-makers' perception may lead them to strengthen their physical preparations for further conflicts; to view the adversary as a permanent enemy(Ikle, 1991: 11); and to have a general sense of direction precluding any shifts or change in foreign policy(Lebow, 1981: 201-202). Decision-makers' perceptions thus lead decision-makers to have their commitments institutionalized (Atkeson, 1976), which may in turn consolidate their negative image of the adversary.

The last essential element in understanding the decision-making process in protracted conflicts is the decision-makers' coping strategies. Upon perceiving events that are out-of-the ordinary, decision-makers may adopt coping strategies to do in dealing with them. Brecher(1979) suggests four stages of coping: (1) information search, (2) consultation, (3) decisional forum, and (4) evaluation of alternatives. This process may reveal the extent to which decision-makers facing an environmental change consider national interest and/or national identity. It may also reveal whether or not decision-makers exhibit cognitive rigidity in seeking and evaluating alternatives, or whether, they prefer weighing the consequences of various options before making a choice. Simply put, these decision-makers tend to make either rational calculations, or decisions that are emotionally biased. Because of the increased negative perception of the enemy in a protracted conflict, having strengthened institutionalized commitments, decision-makers may make biased decisions upon environmental changes, resulting in the exaggeration of the conflict situation.

The above discussion leads us to ask core questions concerning the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island: What initiated the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island? What were the incompatible goals between the two Koreas? Was it national interest or national identity? How and in what ways have national interest and/or national identity of the two Koreas affectively produced the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island on November 23rd, 2010? Given the setting of inter-Korea protracted conflict, in what ways are decision-makers such as former President Lee Myung-bak's foreign policy stances now being perceived during his term as the South Korean president? What was President Lee's psychological setting towards North Korea? How did the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island affect the entire process of inter-Korea protracted conflict? And in turn how has this impacted both Koreas' future foreign policy decision-making against each other? Or in other words, how has the North Korean's decision to carry out the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island contributed to the historical process of Inter-Korea protracted conflict?

IV. Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island

1. Brief Description and Significance

The bombardment of Yeonpyeong island⁴⁾ was an artillery engagement on 23 November 2010 between North Korea and South Korea on Yeonpyeong island. In responding to South Korean artillery exercise in South Korean waters, North Korean forces launched coastal artillery attack on the Yeonpyeong island of South Korea. About 175 artillery shells landed on the Yeonpyeong island. North Korea hit not only military but also civilian targets. The North Korean attack resulted in death of two South Korean marines and two civilians and injured 16 South Korean troops and three civilians. South Korea retaliated and shelled with K-9 155mm self-propelled howitzers two North Korean coastal artillery bases on North Korean territory. South Korea also scrambled three F-16 fighter jets toward the area of conflict. North Korea stated that it only responded to South Korean shells being fired into North Korean territorial waters.⁵⁾

North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong island erupted just 8 months after the sinking of South Korean warship Cheonan. The North's bombardment of Yeonpyeong was the first naval skirmish since the Korean War to kill civilians. The bombardment brought a crisis and tension on the Korean peninsula and thus raised fears of an escalation that could lead to a new war on the Korean peninsula. The UN officially stated that the incident was one of the most serious one since the end of the Korean War.⁶⁾ The bombardment showed a typical pattern of a protracted conflict,

4) Yeonpyeong Island sits just two miles from the NLL(Northern Limit Line), the disputed sea border which the North does not recognize, and only eight miles from the North Korean coast. The island houses a garrison of about 1,000 South Korean marines, and the navy has deployed its newest class of "patrol killer" guided-missile ships in the Western Sea.

5) Korean Central News Agency, "KPA Supreme Command Issues Communique", (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201011/news23/20101123-19ee.html>). 23 November 2010, Retrieved 2014-12-18.

6) Dawn. Tensions high as North, South Korea trade shelling, (<http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/24/tensions-high-as-north-south-korea-trade-shelling.html>). 24 November 2010. Retrieved:

that is, a “drastic turn for the worse in the relations”(*Xinhua News Agency*, 20/12/2010)⁷⁾ of the two Koreas. In his New Year’s address of 2010, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak suggested a standing body for inter-Korean dialogue be set up. This was a change from his usual hard line policy toward North Korea. Kim Jong Il reaffirmed on New Year’s Day his commitment to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, raising hopes for the improved inter-Korean relations.⁸⁾ However, North Korea sank South Korean warship Cheonan in March and the two Koreas exchanged fires in November.

2. Background

Inter-Korea tension and conflict behavior has continued since 1993–1994. In March 1994, North Korea issued a threat of war in an inter-Korean meeting in Panmunjom. In responding to South Korea’ mention of the possibility of UN sanctions against North Korea for its refusal to accept full international nuclear inspections,⁹⁾ North Korea’s chief delegate replied that “Seoul is not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a sea of fire”(*Financial Times*, 22/3/1994). In April 1996, on three occasions, several hundred armed North Korean troops repeatedly crossed into the DMZ. In May, seven North Korean soldiers crossed the DMZ, but withdrew after warning shots were fired. In May and June,

2014–10–18.

7) “S Korea to conduct live-fire drill in Yellow Sea Monday”, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-12/20/c_13656025.htm), Retrieved 2014–10–18.

8) Kim, Junghyun, “2010, a turbulent year for S. Korea, DPRK.” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-12/19/c_13655918.htm), Retrieved 20104 –10–18.

9) Since 1993, North Korea’s institutionalized commitments against the US has become a great contribute to the escalation of the inter-Korea protracted conflict. The US and North Korea experienced two nuclear crises in 1993–94 and 2002–03; North Korea did nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013; North Korea launched missiles in 2006(daepo-dong 2), 2012(Kwangmyong-3 Unit 2). Despite North Korean display of its institutionalized commitments in military sphere, South Korea did not react militarily. What South Korea did against North Korea was mainly verbal denunciation of North Korea, and participation of the Six-Part Talks. However, the two nuclear crises between the US and North Korea, the North’s three nuclear tests, and North Korea’s development of missiles contributed to the escalation of the inter-Korean protract conflict.

North Korean vessels twice crossed the NLL(Northern Limit Line) and had a several-hour standoff with the South Korean navy. In 1997, five North Korean soldiers crossed the DMZ in April, and fired on South Korean positions. In June, three North Korean vessels crossed the NLL and attacked South Korean vessels 2 miles south of the line. On land, fourteen North Korean soldiers crossed 70 m south of the center of the DMZ, leading to a 23-minute exchange of heavy gunfire.

On 22 June 1998, a North Korean midget submarine was seized. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung stated that the submarine intrusion violated the armistice agreement as well as the basic inter-Korean agreement of 1992. South Korea, however, played down the incident in an effort to sustain President Kim's so-called 'Sun-shine policy' toward North Korea(*The Korea Herald*, 16/1/1998). Inter-Korea military clashes not only on the Eastern and Southern coasts but in the DMZ have disappeared since 1999. Since then, inter-Korean military conflicts and crises have occurred frequently only on the West Sea instead(Kim, J.D., 2013: 47-48). Followings are representative cases since 1999.

1) The First Naval Battle of Yeonpyeong Island(15 June 1999)

On 6 June 1999, several North Korean ships began to provoke a nine-day naval confrontation off South Korea's western coast of the disputed sea border known as the NLL. As the confrontation ended in an exchange of fire on 15 June 1999, one North Korean torpedo boat caught fire and sank with its entire crew on board, while five other boats were heavily damaged. Two South Korean vessels sustained minor damage. The first naval battle of the Yeonpyeong island was the most serious naval clash since the end of the Korean War. The conflict played a crucial role in making two Koreas to be in a chain of grudge against each other(J.D. Kim, 2013: 96). A series of naval skirmishes known as the 'Second Battle of Yeonpyeong island'(2002), 'Battle of Daechong island'(2009), 'Sinking of Cheonan'(2010) and 'Bombardment of Yeonpyeong island'(2010) occurred after the first naval battle of Yeonpyeong island.

2) The Second Naval Battle of Yeonpyeong Island(29 June 2002)

In 2001, on twelve separate occasions, North Korean vessels crossed the NLL and then withdrew. North and South Korean forces exchanged fire without injuries on 27 November 2001. Renewed naval clashes near the NLL occurred on June 29 2002. North Korean patrol boats allegedly crossed the NLL and opened fire on a South Korean patrol boat. Four South Koreans and an undetermined number of North Koreans were killed. This incident showed a typical pattern of protracted conflict: conflict, revenge, and conflict and so on. After the first naval conflict in 1999, South Korean government praised soldiers for their victory over the North Korean navy. This resulted in two things: (1) increasing sense of North Korean military's humiliation and commitment to attack in revenge, and (2) increasing sense of South Korean soldiers' conceit. The North Korean navy, contemplating revenge, was on for an opportunity. The South Korean navy was expecting North Korean vessel's cross-over NLL(J.D. Kim, 2013: 109-113). Both Korea's navies were waiting another military conflict at sea. On 11 June, South Korea's military intelligence team intercepted a communication between North Korean navies. A North Korean soldier said "the 1.9 km distance is good enough to shoot. I am going to fire." "However, North Korean commander replied, saying Not today, just return." North Korea's revenge, however, was made on 29 June(J.D. Kim, 2013: 123).

3) Naval Battle of Daechong Island(10 November 2009)

In 2009, clashes between the two Korea's seemed to happen at any time. A reporter for the *New York Times* reported in June 2009 the Yeonpyeong island residents "feared a new battle could erupt at any time"(CBC News, 23/11/2010). On 10 November 2009, a North Korean navy patrol boat crossed down at 11:27 a.m. through the NLL. North Korea did not recognize the NLL. South Korean navy twice warned North Korean boat and urged return to North Korea. North Korea's boat, however, refused. The South Korean navy fired 4 warning shots towards the North Korean boat. In response to the South Korean warning shots, the North Korean navy fired some 50 shots. Then, the South Korean navy craft returned fire with 200 rounds. The North Korean ship was partially destroyed, and managed to escape back

across the NLL. The South Korean navy reported that eight of North Korean soldiers were dead.

The battle of Daecheong made North Korea to have strong commitment to retaliate against South Korea. Right after the Daecheong battle, North Korea held a meeting to establish measures. Kim Kyok-sik, Chief of the General Staff, DPRK, proceeded in late January 2010 to the commander of the 4th Army Corps, which controls the HaeJoo area of North Korea; Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong-un frequently visited military camps in the West Sea region. In addition, North Korea increased one hundred more coastal artilleries. North Korea strengthened its long-range artillery, submarine and submersible, ground-to-air missiles, human torpedo forces, and Air-Cushion Vehicle(ACV) forces(J.D. Kim, 2013: 173. In sum, North Korea made after the Daechong battle institutionalized commitments on the national level to expand its military initiatives in the West Sea area.

4) Sinking of ROK Warship Cheonan(26 March 2010)

On March 26, 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the 1,500-ton ROK Cheonan with a crew of 104, was exploded and sank off Baengryeong island in the West Sea. Out of 104 sailors, 46 died and 58 were rescued. On 20 May 2010, a South Korean led international investigation group concluded that the sinking of the warship was in fact the result of a North Korean torpedo attack. South Korea blamed the sinking of the warship Cheonan on a North Korean torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. North Korea denied any involvement with the sinking of the South Korean ship, and threatened “all-out war” if South Korea retaliates.

What was the background of Cheonan sinking? Previous conflicts between the two Koreas were a background. North Korea might have strong commitment to attack South Korea because of its losses from previous conflicts in 1999 and 2002. South Korea might have least vigilance because of its victory on the previous clashes with North Korea. An officer who had worked for ROK-US combined forces command testified that the US Armed Forces in Korea have warned to the Joint Chiefs of Staffs of South Korea the possibility of North Korea's asymmetric attack since the

Daechong naval conflict until the time of the sinking of Cheonan(J.D. Kim, 2013: 203). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, ignored the advice from the US forces Korea. South Korea's Defense Minister also ignored the advice of admiral Park Jung Sung, who participated in the first Naval battle at Yeonpyeong island as then the commander of the 2nd Fleet. Admiral Park told the Ministry that South Korean navy at the West Sea should prepare for the North Korean submarine attack. The Minister, however, dismissed Admiral Park's advice(J.D. Kim, 2013: 176-77). Joint Chiefs of Staffs of South Korea also dismissed a Special Intelligence Report saying that "attack from North Korea's submersible is anticipated"(J.D. Kim, 2013: 178).

Just two days before the sinking of Cheonan, General Walter Sharp, then the Commander of the ROK-US combined forces command had warned of the possibility that North Korea could "even launch an attack on the ROK"(Wikipedia, "ROK'S Cheonan sinking"). Even a Korea-expert historian expected a military clash in the spring 2010 on the Korean peninsula. Bruce Cumings said, "I, myself, expected some sort of an incident this spring. It just came a little bit early."¹⁰⁾ Cumings argued that the background of Cheonan incident were the clashes in 1999 and 2002. He added that the sinking of Cheonan was just ripped out of context of a continuing war that had never ended. In particular, he pointed out that the sinking of Cheonan should be regarded as part of a two-sided tense situation in a "no man's land" -the so called NLL- which has led to previous incidents in 1999 and 2002. The sinking of Cheonan was a victim of inter-Korea protracted conflict which produced another clash later.

The sinking of Cheonan made the two Koreas to change their policies against each other. Both South and North Koreas strengthened their institutionalized commitment against each other. Despite North Korea's repeated denial of its involvement in the incident, South Korea's President Lee Myong-bak vowed that North Korea would "pay a price corresponding to its provocative acts."¹¹⁾ On 24 May 2010, President Lee

10) "Historian Bruce Cumings: US Stance on Korea Ignores Tensions Rooted in 65-Year-Old Conflict; North Korea Sinking Could be Response '09 South Korea Attack" (<http://www.democracynow.org/2010/5/27/nk>). Retrieved: 2015-09-01

11) Kim, Junghyun, "2010, a turbulent year for S. Korea, DPRK", (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-12/19/c_13655918.htm), Retrieved 20104 -10-18.

announced the so-called 24 May Action: (1) to refer North Korea's provocation to the UN Security Council, (2) not to approve sailing of North Korean ships through South Korea's territorial waters, (3) to stop inter-Korean trade, (4) not to approve South Korea's visit to North Korea, (5) disapprove South Korean new investment in North Korea, and (6) to suspend in principle supporting services for North Korea. In addition, South Korea took military measures: (1) firm punishment of North Korea's provocations, (2) resumption of psychological warfare with loudspeaker broadcasting against North Korea, (3) implementing the US/South Korea's joint military drill in the West Sea, and (4) participate in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Security Initiative. Furthermore, South Korea's plan to retake its wartime operational control from the US in 2012 was put off to 2015. South Korea feared of losing security umbrella prevailed in the wake of the sinking.¹²⁾

The 24 May Action became a turning point for the two Koreas to return to the conflict situation between the two Koreas(J.D. Kim, 2013: 249). On 25 May, North Korea released its countermeasures against the 24 May Act of South Korea. The North's countermeasures included the cutting of all ties and communications. North Korea would revert to a wartime footing in regard to South Korea and disallow any South Korean ships and aircraft to enter the territory of North Korea.¹³⁾ On 27 May, North Korea announced it would scrap an agreement aimed at preventing accidental naval clashes with South Korea and that any South Korean vessel found crossing the disputed maritime border would be immediately attacked.¹⁴⁾

3. Phases of Inter-Korea International Crisis

1) Pre-Crisis Phase

As we have seen, naval skirmishes between the two Koreas in the West Sea have

12) Kim, Junghyun, "2010, a turbulent year for S. Korea, DPRK", (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-12/19/c_13655918.htm), Retrieved 20104 -10-18.

13) Thatcher, Jonathan(25 May 2010), "Text from North Korea statement", (<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64O3YU20100525>), Retrieved: 2010-05-25.

14) BBC(27 May 2010), "North Korea scraps South Korea military safeguard pact", (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia_pacific/10170019.stm), Retrieved: 2010-05-27.

not been uncommon since 1999. The sinking of Cheonan in 2010 made tension on the Korean peninsula in general, and in the West Sea area in particular, accumulate. In August 2010, North Korea fired 110 artillery rounds near Yeonpyeong and Baengryong island which is 1-2 kilometers south of the NLL. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un of North Korea was promoted on 28 September to the rank of four-star general. In October 2010, North Korea proposed a talk with South Korea to discuss anti-North Korean leafleting via balloons from the South. North Korea warned of “merciless physical retaliation” if South Korea did not accept the talks. South Korea rebuffed the North Korea’s proposal(*CBC News*, 23/11/2010). On 29 October, shots were exchanged again between both Korea’s soldiers across the DMZ.

Inter-Korea tense relations have worsened again after an US nuclear scientist visited North Korea on 12 November. The scientist, Siegfried S. Hecker, a Stanford professor said he saw “hundreds and hundreds” of centrifuges that had just been installed. He said that North Korea claimed 2,000 centrifuges were already installed and running. Meanwhile, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff announced on 16 November that the South Korean army would launch a large scale annual exercise, a Hoguk(Safeguarding the Nation) Exercise, the following week to sharpen its joint combat capabilities against North Korea. The JCS of South Korea added that about 70,000 troops from the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps would be mobilized for the exercise. Such announcement sparked North Korea’s strong opposition. The ‘Hoguk Exercise’ has been sharply criticized by North Korea as “stimulating an invasion of the North” and “a means to provoke war.” North Korea has regarded South Korea’s(and with the US) military exercise such as the Hoguk exercise as a war preparing exercise for a combined military attacks against it.¹⁵⁾ In 2010, the exercise involved 70,000 troops from all four branches of the South Korean military, equipped with 600 tracked vehicles, 90 helicopters, 50 warships, and 500 aircrafts. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 7th Air Force of the US participated in the drill.

North Korea sent on 22 November, a day before the bombardment of Yeonpyeong

15) Son, Won-je, “Experts cite succession and diplomatic pressure following artillery fire”, *The Hankyoreh*, 2010-11-24.

Island, a telephone message to South Korea, saying that “the spot you are going to fire is the place where the border line had not been determined. If you neglect our warning, we will respond militarily.” State-run news agency of North Korea reported on the same day that Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong-un, and other key political and military figures had visited duck and fish farms in an area about 60 miles(100 kilometers) from the base where the artillery barrage was launched. It was also reported that Kim Jong il and Kim Jong-un had visited on 22 November the Kaemori artillery base, whence many of the North Korean shells were fired(*JoongAng Ilbo*, 25/11/2010).

2) International Crisis Phase

(1) South Korea's *Hoguk* Military Drill and North Korea's Response

At 08:20 a.m. on the very day of Hoguk drill, North Korea sent a telex message to South Korea. The message wrote that “South Korea's Hoguk military practice is a war drill for a preemptive attack. Stop it immediately.” North Korea's message also said that “The North would not just sit back if the South fired shots into the North Korean territorial waters.” However, Kim Tae-young, the Defense Minister of South Korea, made a decision to do the drill as scheduled because the drill was an annual one which had been continued since November 1996(J.D. Kim, 2013: 286). South Korea's firing practice began at 10:15 a.m. in the direction southwest of Yeonpyong island. South Korea practiced firing Bulcan artillery with a range of 2-3 km. North Korea did not show any movement at this time. However, North Korea began to show movements at the time slightly over 11:00 a.m. when South Korea launched 105 mm Tow rockets with a range of 13km. The South Korean army, however, continued its military practices.

From 11:15 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., South Korean military intelligence team acknowledged the possibility of North Korean provocation in the waters. The intelligence team distributed warning messages to the Blue House, the Korean CIA, and top military decision-makers including the defense minister and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The message warned of the possibility of North Korea's firing

at the waters(J.D. Kim, 2013: 291). However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea underestimated the intelligence warning. Most related people testified that top members of the JCS, including Lieutenant General Lee Hong-ki, Operation Director of the JCS, had thought that North Korea would at most fire its coastal artillery into the West Sea(J.D. Kim, 2013: 292). At 14:30 p.m., North Korea deployed five MIG-23 ML fighters from the 60th Regiment at Pukchang. The MIG-23 fighters were ready to fly missions at a nearby air base in the North. The North Korean navy also readied ground-to-ship missiles and ordered its warships to be combat ready. At 14:34 p.m., North Korean coastal artillery batteries on Mudo, and a recently redeployed 122-mm MLRS(Multiple Launch Rocket System) at Kaemori-got, North Korea's Hwanghae Province, opened fire on the Yeonpyeong Island. Soon after firing artillery shells, North Korea declared a 'semi state of war.'

At 14:35 p.m., South Korean military called for a crisis management committee. South Korea conducted emergency sorties with two KF-16 fighters at 14:38 p.m.; deployed four F-15K fighters at 14:40 p.m.; and conducted additional emergency sorties with two KF-16 fighters at 14:46 p.m. South Korean marines at Yeonpyong Island fired at a North Korean artillery base at 14:47 p.m. 50 shells with three K-9 self-propelled howitzers. F-15K fighter jets were launched for the attack site. It was known on 23rd that South Korean military planned to attack North Korean artillery bases with F-15 fighter jets if North Korea seemed to prepare firing missiles after North Korea's coastal artillery attacks. At 14:50, South Korea issued a 'Jindogae hana(Jindo Dog 1)' alert, which is the highest military alert given for a local provocation.

At 14:55 p.m., North Korea stopped firing temporarily. However, it resumed its firing at 15:12 p.m., and fired 20 shells, all of which landed on the Yeonpyeong Island. South Korea also resumed its artillery firing back 30 shells at 15:25 p.m. with K-9 howitzers in response to the North's second firing of shells. The North stopped its firing at 15:41. Just right before the North stopped firing, South Korea sent a telex message to the North Korea's representative of the inter-Korea general-level meetings and requested an immediate halt to artillery shelling. At 15:40~16:00 p.m., Han Min-ku, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

Walter Sharp, commander of US Forces Korea, held an emergency video conference. South Korea stopped firing at 16:42 p.m. The US and ROK forces were put on WATCHCON 2 indicating a vital threat, the same level as was used after South Korea's naval corvette, the *Cheonan*, was torpedoed in March 2010. President Lee of South Korea ordered the Suwon Korean Air Force Group 10, made up of F-15 and F-16s and the Pyeongtaek Navy Force 2 to be on alert.

(2) Crisis Decision-making of South Korea and the US

At 14:40 p.m. on 23, President Lee entered into the underground bunker beneath the Blue House, the presidential office and residence, to have emergency meeting with his security-related aides. It was known by a Blue House official that President Lee said “(We) should carefully manage the situation to prevent the escalation of the clash” before the emergency meeting(*The Korea Herald*, 2010.11.23). At the time slightly over 15:00 p.m., the President called for an emergency meeting with his security-related ministers and senior aides. The attendants of the emergency meeting were ministers Kim Sung-hwan of foreign affairs, Hyun In-taek of unification, Kim Tae-young of defense, Maeng Hyung-kyu of public administration and security, Lim Chae-min of the prime minister's office, and Won Sei-hoon of National Intelligence Service. A presidential spokesman said at that time AFP that “He(the President) is now in an underground war room to discuss possible responses with ministers of related agencies and national security advisors.” The discussion at the meeting, however, was mainly focused on the issue of why South Korean soldiers on the Yeonpyeong island fired, not on how South Korea was to cope militarily with the North's firings(J.D. Kim, 2013: 294). The issue of how to deal with militarily against North Korea's firing was discussed only among aides to the president.

In the bunker, President Lee also held a video conference with Operation Headquarters of both navy and air force, and with General Han Min-ku, the Chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Han reported to the President that the North's firings had been viewed as localized provocation and that general Han had sent a telex

message to North Korea not to aggravate the situation. President Lee's top aide for public relations Hong Sang-pyo reported in an official statement following an emergency security meeting that President Lee said, "the firing of artillery by North Korea on Yeonpyeong island constitutes an indisputable armed provocation against the Republic of Korea, warning of stern retaliation should there be another provocation." Hong Sang-pyo added that President Lee said "North Korean authorities will have to take full responsibility for the incident." President Lee told later ministers in charge of foreign affairs and security to "respond firmly beyond the rules of engagement", according to a government spokesman.

President Lee visited the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 8:40 p.m. During his visit to the JCS, President Lee said, "The provocation this time can be regarded as an invasion of South Korean territory."¹⁶⁾ President Lee warned North Korea could launch further provocations. President Lee accentuated that if the North Korea attempt further provocations, then South Korea "should punish them severely to a point where they will never think of another attack."¹⁷⁾ South Korea made other decisions upon North Korea's bombardment. South Korea's armed forces were placed on their highest alert level. The US-led Combined Forces Command(CFC) raised its Watch Condition(WATCHCON) to level 2, which denoted vital indications of a security threat. Defense Minister Kim Tae-young ordered more K-9 self-propelled howitzers to be deployed with the marine unit on Yeonpyeong island to counter any further North Korean actions. The Unification Ministry decided to cancel inter-Korean Red Cross talks, which were slated for 25th of November. The ministry also banned all visits from business people and staff to the Joint Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex on the 24th. South Korea also suspended promised flood aid to North Korea. South Korea began looking at ways to push the UN to condemn North Korea. Presidential spokesman Hong Sang-pyo told reports, "Seeing the North's attack as an armed provocation, the government will cooperate with or make requests to allies or the

16) CNN, "After North Korean strike, South Korean leader threatens 'retaliation'", (<http://cpf.cleanprint.net/cpf/cpf?action=print&type=filePrint&key=cnn&url=http%3A>), Retrieved: 2015-04-25.

17) "Seoul Warns of 'Severe Punishment' Over N. Korean Attack", <http://english.chosun.com/svc/news/printContent.html>, Retrieved: 2015-07-02.

UN.” The South Korean government said that it was consulting the US and other allies to cope with North Korea’s provoke on the 24th.

US President Obama was awakened at 3:55 a.m. by his national security advisor, Thomas E. Donilon. Donilon told President Obama of North Korea’s attack. Immediately upon his return to the White House from a trip to Indiana, President Obama had a meeting with his national security team. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and Secretaries of State and Defense Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates participated. Also participating in person or via video link were the chairman of the US military Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen and the commander of US forces in Korea, General Walter Sharp as well as Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of US Pacific Command and US Ambassador to the United Nation Susan Rice.¹⁸⁾

A decision came after President Obama’s emergency meeting in the White House Situation Room and after a phone call with President Lee of South Korea. After the meeting, the White House released a statement, saying that Obama reiterated the unshakable support of the US for the Republic of Korea and that he discussed ways to advance peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The statement continued to say that “The two presidents agreed to hold combined military exercises and enhanced training in the days ahead to continue the close security cooperation between our two countries, and to underscore the strength of our alliance and commitment to peace and security in the region.”¹⁹⁾ The US and South Korea’ joint military exercise was the first US significant response to North Korean shelling. US Forces spokesman David Oten in Seoul said the “four-day drill will begin on 28 November” and “include the US aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington” in the West Sea. Oten added, “This exercise is defensive in nature. While planned well before yesterday’s unprovoked artillery attack, it demonstrates the strength of the alliance and our commitment to regional stability through deterrence. It is also

18) Voice of America, “Obama meets with top advisors on Korean situation”, (<http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/131119.html>), Retrieved: 2105-07-16.

19) CNN, “After North Korean strike, South Korean leader threatens ‘retaliation’”, (<http://cpf.cleanprint.net/cpf/cpf?action=print&type=filePrint&key=cnn&url=http%3A...>), Retrieved: 2015-04-25.

designed to improve our military interoperability.”²⁰⁾

What led the US to implement a joint military exercise with South Korea? The US was forced to choose among unpalatable choice: (1) responding with verbal condemnations and a modest tightening of sanctions, which has done little to halt new attacks; (2) starting military exercises that are largely symbolic, or (3) reacting strongly, which could risk a broad war in which South Korea’s capital, Seoul, would be the first target. Among the above alternatives, the US chose a symbolic strategy. Although there were firings between two Koreas, the US did not see the possibility of all-out war on the Korean peninsula. The United States said on 23 it was too early to consider a military response to North Korea’s attacks on a South Korean island. The Pentagon spokesman Colonel Dave Lapan said that “At this point it’s premature to say we’re considering any action.” State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley said the US viewed the artillery fire as a “one-off, premeditated act, not a sign that war was imminent. We don’t see that North Korea is preparing for an extended military confrontation.”²¹⁾ The decision to send the aircraft carrier came as the South Korean military went into what it termed “crisis status.”²²⁾

(3) Explanations of North Korea’s Bombardment

Why did North Korea bomb the Yeonpyeong island? Many explanations exist. First, some analysts argued that the North made provocations because of Kim Jung-un’s succession. Kim Jung-un was promoted on 28 September to the rank of four-star general, a prerequisite for his ascendancy to power. Michael Hayden, the former director of the two main US intelligence agencies(the CIA and NSA), said the Cheonan sinking and the artillery firing may be related to the power succession in

20) Voice of America, “US, S. Korea Reply to Pyeongyang Attack with New Military Exercises”, (<http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/131120.html>), Retrieved: 2015-07-16.

21) John Pomfret, “U.S. aircraft carrier’s arrival off Korean peninsula also sends a message to China”, (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/24/AR2010112407028_pf.html).

22) Sanger, David E., “South Koreans and U.S. to Stage a Joint Exercise”, (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24nkorea.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all), Retrieved: 2014-07-02.

Pyongyang. Hayden said heir apparent Kim Jung-un might be trying to demonstrate power and compare himself to his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. Mark Fitzpatrick of IISS(the International Institute for Strategic Studies) argued that both the sinking of Cheonan and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong would be portrayed by North Korea as victories and seen by Kim Jong Il as a way of bolstering the position of his son, Kim Jong-un(cited in *BBC News*, 1/3/2011). Zhang Liangui, a North Korea expert at the Central Party School, Beijing, argued that Kim Jung-un had deliberately destabilized the environment in order to mobilize the military and consolidate his power(cited in *CBC News*, 23/11/2010).

Second, some argued that North Korea had attempted through its risky behavior to have negotiations with the US. Sue Mi Terri, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, said, “North Koreans love to escalate, create tensions, then bring us back to the negotiating table and then reap concessions”(cited in *CBC News*, 23/11/2010). Choi Jin-wook, a North Korea expert at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said North Korea had become frustrated over the Obama administration’s refusal to remove a broad range of sanctions against the regime for its continuing nuclear efforts. Abe Denmark, director of the Asia program at the Center for a New American Security said, “This is part of a very concerted effort on behalf of North Korea to demonstrate resolve, to demonstrate strength, but also to try to pressure the international community into coming back to talks and giving into concessions.” Michael Hayden also said Pyongyang’s behavior might also be intended to get the US and other nations to return to stalled negotiations about Pyongyang’s nuclear programs.²³⁾

The above mentioned explanations provide some reasons why North Korea provoked South Korea. However, such explanations can not answer why North Korea made provocations five times only in the sea, in particular in the West Sea area, since 1999. North Korea could have made provocations on the land or on the East Sea area. North Korea, however, did not make such provocations. I argue that North

23) Voice of America, “US, S. Korea Reply to Pyeongyang Attack with New Military Exercises”, (<http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/131120.html>), Retrieved: 2015-07-16.

Korea made provocations because of the NLL(Northern Limit Line). Michael Breen emphasized that the bombardment of Yeonpyeong and the sinking of Cheonan in March happened in disputed waters.²⁴⁾ To Breen, the fact that North Korea had indicated the importance of NLL, arguing that the South “recklessly fired into our sea area” was significant. Bruce Linger, the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, also said that the North’s shelling was in part to assert sovereignty over the disputed waters off the west coast of the divided peninsula(*People’s Daily Online*, 25/11/2010). Although South Korea argued that the NLL has no controversial issue because the NLL is a territory of South Korea, North Korea did not acknowledge the argument of South Korea.

(4) The Northern Limit Line

North Korea has perceived the NLL²⁵⁾ as its pivotal interest. First, North Korea perceived a security interest of the NLL. North Korea thought that Haeju city, a gateway to Pyongyang, was blocked by the NLL, damaging its national interest. North Korea calculated that Pyongyang would be in grave danger if South Korea forward deployed key weapons near the NLL. North Korea thus was being aware of crisis situations due to the NLL(J.D. Kim, 2013: 335). North Korea also perceived the economic value of the NLL. North Korea began to acknowledge the economic importance of Haeju when the USSR, one of North Korea’s important trading

24) Michael Breen, “Attack in disputed waters”, (<http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/common/printview.asp?categoryCode=170&newsIdx...>), Retrieved: 2015-08-06.

25) Until 1973, North Korea had not violated the NLL. North Korea insisted that it had not been informed of the existence of the NLL, and thus that no necessity of disputes had been needed earlier. The North sees the line, according to the KCNA statement, as “the final line for stopping the defectors to the north”, decided only by the US “self-justified interests”. North Korea announced on 1 August 1977 the Exclusive Economic Zone of up to 200 nautical miles. North Korea claimed on 21 July 1999 a “Military Demarcation Line at West Sea”, an extension line from the land boundary equidistance from the north and south mainland. North Korea urged that its claim was based on international law delimitation decisions. North Korea claimed on 2 August 2002 that the NLL violated the Korean Armistice Agreement; the NLL was a root cause of inter-Korean military clashes; and that the US and South Korea had tried to use the NLL to spark military conflict against North Korea. North Korea established on 21 December 2009 a “peacetime firing zone” south of the NLL in waters disputed with South Korea.

partners, collapsed in 1991. North Korea wanted to establish a special economic zone and international port at Haeju to develop alternative trade sources. To North Korea, due to the NLL, it is required for ships to travel along the North Korean coast for 65 nautical miles(120km). If there was no NLL enforcement, the travel distance would only be 3 nautical miles(5.6 km) off the shore. The NLL thus prevented, thought North Korea, the development of Haeju as a large international port.²⁶⁾

To North Korea, the NLL was determined only by the US “self-justified interests.” North Korea announced the Exclusive Economic Zone of up to 200 nautical miles on 1 August 1977. On 21 July 1999, North Korea claimed a ‘Military Demarcation Line in the West Sea’, an extension line from the land boundary equidistance from the north and south mainland. North Korea urged that its claim was based on international law delimitation decisions. North Korea claimed on 2 August 2002 that the NLL violated the Korean Armistice Agreement, that the NLL was a root cause of inter-Korean military clashes, and that the US and South Korea had tried to use the NLL to spark military conflict against North Korea. On 21 December 2009, North Korea established a ‘peacetime firing zone’ south of the NLL in waters disputed with South Korea. Since January 2010, North Korea had concentrated joint military power composed of ground forces, navy, and air force into the West Sea area. Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong-un frequently visited the area to see the military exercises at the West Sea. Two Kims visits were more frequent than before since Kim Kyok-sik became the commander of the 4th army corps of North Korea. Kim Kyok-sik has been widely believed to have commanded shelling of Yeonpyeong Island(Wikipedia on Kim Kyok-sik). North Korea furthermore adopted a new strategy for the West Sea, activating GPS disturbance at the West of the Korean peninsula.

In this context, North Korea defined South Korea’s military drill as a “war maneuvers for a war of aggression.” In its statement,²⁷⁾ North Korean military said,

26) Rodger Baker, “Importance of the Koreas’ Northern Limit Line”, STRATFOR, 24 November 2010.

27) CNN, “After North Korean strike, South Korean leader threatens ‘retaliation’”, (<http://cpf.cleanprint.net/cpf/cpf?action=print&type=filePrint&key=cnn&url=http%3A>), Retrieved: 2015-04-25.

“The South Korean puppet group” engaged in “reckless military provocation” by firing “ozens of shells” inside North Korean territorial waters “despite the repeated warnings of the DPRK.” The statement continued to say that “the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK standing guard over the inviolable territorial waters of the country took such a decisive military step as reacting to the military provocation of the puppet group with a prompt power physical strike.” The statement emphasized its commitment, saying “It is a traditional mode of counter-action of the army of the DPRK to counter the firing of the provocateurs with merciless strikes” against the enemy “if the border is crossed.” The statement accentuated that the US and South Korea’s military exercise had stimulated an invasion of North Korea by implementing a live fire drill in its waters. North Korea perceived the US/South Korea’s military drill as another step to secure US/South Korea’s unilateral claim on the NLL.

Despite North Korea’s claim on the NLL, South Korea has sustained that the NLL is its territory and has regarded the NLL is a pivotal interest to South Korea. South Korea perceived that if the NLL was attacked and controlled by North Korea, then Incheon of South Korea would be under North Korean threats, and finally the security of Seoul would be jeopardized. South Korea thus saw defending the NLL as the deciding factor in maintaining the state. Concerning North Korea’s argument on the NLL, South Korea has claimed since 1970s that (1) The NLL is an indispensable measure to administer the Armistice Agreement, (2) The NLL is in the approximate mid-position between the South Korean islands and the North Korean mainland, and (3) North Korea acquiesced to the NLL until 1973, so implicitly recognized the NLL. In August 2002, South Korean Ministry of National Defense argued again that North Korea’s claims regarding the NLL were groundless. The Ministry asserted that the NLL had been the practical sea demarcation line for the past 49 years and had been confirmed and validated by the 1992 South-North Basic Agreement, and thus that decisive response would be made to all North Korean intrusions(The Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 200). In addition, President Lee of South Korea clarified his position on the NLL, saying that the NLL was a critical border that contributes to keeping peace on South Korea’s land.

3) End-crisis Phase

While the US and South Korea carried out joint military exercises in the West Sea, North Korea stepped up its combat readiness. On 28 November 2010, the first day of US/South Korea's joint military drill, South Korean Yonhap News reported that North Korea had readied surface-to-surface missiles as the US and South Korea began military drills in the West Sea. North Korea deployed additional aircrafts at its air force bases in Southern Hwanghae Province and Southern Pyongyang Province. Pyongyang also ordered additional weapons made ready-to-fire. In response, the South Korean military elevated its state of alert on the coast.²⁸⁾ As US/South Korea's joint military exercise entered its second day, North Korea warned it would uproot the "seeds of war." North Korea asserted that the drill was bringing the peninsula "to the brink of war" and called it a "grave provocation." The *Rodong Sinmun* (29 November 2010), said in a commentary that "We don't want war, but are never afraid of one", that "If internal and external war maniacs make provocation again, we will counter it without hesitation, eliminate the stronghold of aggressors entirely and uproot the cause of war clearly", and that "It would be a miscalculation if the US and South Korean warlike forces attempt to astound and pressure us by deploying a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier." However, a further clash between North Korea and US-South Korea did not happen until the end of the military exercise. The inter-Korea crisis caused by North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong island ended.

4) Impacts

(1) South Korea

North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong brought significant impacts on South Korea. President Lee made a nationally televised speech on 29 November. From his speech, we see his increased negative perception of North Korea, and his willingness to strengthen South Korea's commitments to retaliate against North Korea. President

28) Kim Se-jeong, "North Korea in semi state of war", (<http://koreatimes.co.kr/common/printview.asp?categoryCode=116&newsIdx...>), Retrieved: 2015-08-06.

Lee said in his speech that “an attack against civilians is an “inhumane” crime strictly prohibited even during a war”, that “we cannot contain our anger over the Pyongyang cruelty that ignored even the lives of children”, that “I will make sure we make the North pay the price for any provocations”, that “it is difficult to expect the North to abandon nuclear weapons and military brinkmanship”, and that “now is the time to take actions rather than 100 words.”

President Lee’s perception of North Korea was that South Korea was only a victim threatened endlessly by the North. He said in his televised speech that [South Korea] “has endured and endured again and again against North Korea’s provocations. The reason South Korea endured were the only hope that North Korea would change some day and the willingness toward the peace of Korean peninsula.” President Lee, however, disappointed by the North’s numerous provocations against the South. President Lee said that although South Korea had tried for the past 20 years to solve North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and cooperation, what South Korea received in return was North Korea’s nuclear development and the sinking of Cheonan. The President now came to have tougher learning experience. President Lee said “we have learned that it would be hard to expect North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs and military brinkmanship.” The President further noticed that “more tolerance and patience will only bring bigger provocations.” The President thus vowed to make North Korea “pay the price” for its “inhumane” artillery attack. President Lee decided to review the rules of engagement. The President thought that South Korea in the past had been too passive when it comes to acts of aggression by North Korea. President Lee cited the sinking of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, in March.²⁹⁾ South Korea redefined North Korea as its ‘enemy’. Since 2000, South Korea had not described the North Korean army as an ‘enemy’. However, South Korea began in its *2010 White Paper on National Defense* to call the North Korean regime and its army as ‘enemy of South Korea’.

North Korea’s attack also elicited strong public outcry in South Korea. The Institute for Security and Development Policy(ISDP), Stockholm, reported that,

29) “Artillery heard as S. Korea, U.S. begin military drills”, (<http://www.ctvnews.ca/artillery-heard-as-s-korea-u-s-begin-military-drills-1.579618>), Retrieved: 2014-10-08.

referring to a poll which had been taken in the late November, some 80% of South Koreans would support strong military retaliation when the North attacked again; and that a significant minority even said they would not oppose a war with the North.³⁰⁾ A survey done on 1 Dec. 2010 by The Korean Society Opinion Institute(KSOI) showed that, comparing with the case of sinking of Cheonan, the opinion that South Korean respondents dare to do localized war, if necessary, increased from 18.8% to 25.8%; and even that 'full-scale war' from 6.4% to 13.3%.³¹⁾ In addition, approximately 1,500 retired marines staged a protest against North Korea in downtown Seoul on 27th. The retired marines called on the government to retaliate, and accused the past Kim Dae Jung and Roh Mu-hyun governments of weakening the military in the name of Sun-shine policy. A group of 100 retired special soldiers also launched an anti-North Korea demonstration near the Ministry of National Defense building in Seoul. The retired special soldiers urged the government not to sit back in response to the North's attack. Since the North Korean shelling on 23, South Korean government has come to be under huge domestic pressure to take a tough stance towards North Korea(*BBC News*, 20/12/2010).

South Korea reviewed its policy of restraint against the North Korea's provocations, and vowed to retaliate strongly against North Korea's provocations. Kim Kwan-jin, the new defense minister of South Korea, pledged in December, to bomb North Korea if it attacked again. Chairman Gen. Han Min-koo, Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea, said "if North Korea provokes us further, we will respond for the right of our self-defense, and North Korea will have to pay a dear price for such provocation."³²⁾ President Lee ordered the defense ministry to strengthen the military preparedness against North Korean attack. Until his order, South Korean army had pursued a defense reform, focusing on the reduction of military strength of

30) Zifcak, Nicholas, "South Korea at Odds Over North Korea Policy", (<http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/south-korea-at-odds-over-north-korea-polic...>), Retrieved: 2014-10-08.

31) http://www.eai.or.kr/inc/viewContentPanel.asp?catcode=&code=kor_eainmedia&idx..., Retrieved: 2015-07-10.

32) Zifcak, Nicholas, "South Korea at Odds Over North Korea Policy", (<http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/south-korea-at-odds-over-north-korea-polic...>), Retrieved: 2014-10-08

ROK marines defending the West Sea area. According to the reform bill, it was planned that the marine troops would reduce 3,200 by 2020; and the Brigade Six would reduce its size to that of regiment. However, after the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong, President Lee ordered to go back to square one with the defense reform. President Lee instead ordered to “prepare with the most advanced military equipment in the world against the North Korean localized battles and asymmetric conflict on the vulnerable security area”(Dong-A Ilbo, 26/11/2010). On 15 June 2011, South Korea founded a Defense Headquarters for Northwestern Islands, which would be under the direct control of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The corps was made up of 2,000 soldiers. South Korea intended to strengthen the responsibility and discretion of the commander in field. One year after the bombardment of the Yeonpyeong island the South Korean military presence on the island had been substantially increased. South Korea deployed more K-9 howitzers, K-10 automatic ammunition re-supply vehicles, 130-millimeter, 36-round, truck-mounted Kuryong multiple rocket launchers and AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters. On 19 May 2013 the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that “dozens” of Spike NLOS missiles had been deployed on Baengryeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island(Wikipedia on ‘Bombardment of Yeonpyeong’).

(2) North Korea

After the clashes, North Korea asserted that its leaders were vowing a sea of fire if their territory was breached and if the US/South Korea went ahead with military exercises, they should be seeing unpardonable provocation.³³⁾ In this context, North Korea reinforced its military strength in the West Sea area. North Korea began to possess the ability to attack five South Korea’s islands within 30 minutes; to deploy at the West Sea area the latest model of long range artillery and field artillery; and deploy human-torpedo units to countermeasure the asymmetric US/South Korea joint military power. North Korea also strengthened its institutionalized commitments to defend the West Sea area: Top decision-makers as

33) “Artillery heard as S. Korea, U.S. begin military drills”, (<http://www.ctvnews.ca/artillery-heard-as-s-korea-u-s-begin-military-drills-1.579618>), Retrieved: 2014-10-08.

well as leading members of the military made frequent on-site inspection, and established a cooperative operation system made up of armed forces, navy, and air force. North Korea reinforced ground military power with coastal artillery and long range artillery. North Korea also strengthened its military capacity in the West Sea area with Air-Cushion Vehicle(ACV) for surprise infiltrating capacity, capacity of secret infiltration and blow with submersible, and air capacity with Suhoi and MiGs. In particular, 4th Corps Army in Haejoo has authorization to launch operations without waiting for directions or direct control from Pyongyang(J.D. Kim, 2013: 335).

V. Conclusion

Inter-Korea relations since 1993 have been a typical protracted conflict with numerous clashes and North Korea's provocations. Even when South Korea's two presidents Kim Dae Jung(1998-2003) and Roh Mu-hyun(2003-2008) pursued the sun-shine policy towards North Korea, inter-Korea crises occurred: the first naval battle of Yeonpyeong island(June 1999) and the second naval battle of Yeonpyeong island(June 2002). When Lee Myong-bak became the President(2008-2013) of South Korea, he took a hardline policy toward North Korea. During his term as President, the naval battle of Daechong island(November 2009), the sinking of ROK warship Cheonan(March 2010), and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island occurred(November 2010).

On 16 November 2010, South Korea's military announced that it would implement, the following week, an annual military exercise, the 'Hoguk Exercise'. South Korea's announcement was sharply criticized by North Korea as a 'war preparing exercise.' On 22 November, North Korea warned South Korea not to fire into the spot where borderline had not been determined. North Korea asked again, even in the morning of the 23, that South Korea not implement Hoguk exercise in North Korean territorial waters. South Korea, however, began its drill at 10:15 a.m.. After a while,

South Korea's intelligence team detected a movement of North Korea to attack South Korea. Ignoring the information, South Korea continued its military drills. At 14:34, North Korea opened fire on the Yeonpyeong island. North Korea also declared a 'semi state of war.'

Responding to the North's attack, South Korean marines at Yeonpyeong Island fired at North Korean artillery base. South Korea issued a 'Jindo Dog 1', the highest military alert for a local provocation. South Korea's F-15K fighters and KF-16 fighters took emergency sorties. An inter-Korea crisis occurred. President Lee of South Korea had an emergency meeting with his security-related ministers and aides. South Korea made decisions that North Korea would have to take full responsibility for the incident. The US-led combined forces command raised its Watch Condition to level 2. The US and South Korea made a decision to hold four-day combined military exercises beginning 28 November. Although South Korean military termed the North's attack as 'crisis status', the US thought that the possibility of all-out war on the Korean peninsula was low. North Korea stepped up its combat readiness and warned its retaliation while US and South Korea carried out their joint military exercise. However, further inter-Korea clashes did not occur. The inter-Korea crisis caused by the North Korean bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island ended.

The North's bombardment of Yeonpyeong island brought significant impacts on both Korea in general, and on South Korea in particular. As defense of the West Sea area became one of their core national values, both Koreas institutionalized their national commitments to protect the West Sea area. In this context, it is inevitable for the two Koreas, being equipped with the most fatal military power, to rival against each other in a very cramped area. Metaphorically speaking, the inter-Korean rivalry at the West Sea is identical with keeping a lion and tiger confined in a same cage(J.D. Kim, 2013: 328-9). Both Koreas' concentration of their military strength -including army, navy, and air force- in the narrow West Sea area may make it difficult for both Koreas to successfully manage future crisis. In particular, future conflict in the West Sea would be more difficult to control and to prevent crisis escalation(J.D. Kim, 2013: 330).

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연평도 포격(2010): 장기갈등이론에 의한 분석*

Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island(2010): An Analysis based on Protracted Conflict Theory

장 경 룡**

요약(Abstract): 이 연구는 장기갈등이론의 효용성을 살피는 것이다. 북한이 2010년 행한 연평도 포격을 사례로 연구한다. 국가이익과 국가정체성 모두 장기갈등의 원인이 된다는 사항과 장기갈등의 지속에는 3가지 중요한 변수가 작용된다는 사항이 논문의 주장이다. 3가지 변수는 상대방에 대한 정책결정자들의 인식, 장기갈등에 참여하는 모든 국가들의 제도화된 의지, 그리고 편견이 작용되는 정책결정이다. 이 논문의 결론은 장기갈등이 남북한의 갈등을 설명하는 데 이론적 설명력을 제공한다는 점과 북한의 연평도 포격은 67년 이상 진행되어 왔을 뿐만 아니라 앞으로도 남북한 모두에게 심각한 우려가 되는 남북한 장기갈등의 하부 갈등행태라는 점이다.

핵심어(Key Words): 연평도 포격(bombardment of Yeonpyeong island), 남북한 갈등(inter-Korea conflict), 북방한계선(NLL) 북한(North Korea), 장기갈등(protracted conflict), 남한(South Korea)

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** Department of Childhood English Education, Kwangju Women's University
(Email: krchang@kwu.ac.kr)